This paper re-considers the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique using a DSGE sticky price model in which a weak central bank response to inflation generates equilibrium indeterminacy. The model is calibrated on the magnitude of the historical shift in the Federal Reserve's policy rule and is capable of generating the decline in the volatility of inflation and real activity observed in U.S. data. Using Monte Carlo simulations and a backward-looking model of aggregate supply and demand, we show that shifts in the policy rule induce breaks in both the reduced-form coefficients and the reduced-form error variances. The statistics of popular parameter stability tests are shown to have low power if such heteroskedasticity is neglected. In contrast, when the instability of the reduced-form error variances is accounted for, the Lucas critique is found to be empirically relevant for both artificial and actual data.
Introduction
The Lucas critique comes as close to a natural law as seems possible in macroeconomics.
While its theoretical validity is largely uncontested, there is, however, a surprising lack of empirical support in the literature. A host of studies have argued that the relevance of the Lucas critique is limited in practice. In particular, shifts in policy seem not to have any significant effects on the stability of backward representations of macroeconomic models for various historical episodes. We argue in this paper that the evident inapplicability of the Lucas critique is due to problems with the size and power of the econometric tests used.
We use a simple structural model of the U.S. economy as a data-generating process (DGP) to illustrate these issues both conceptually and by means of a Monte Carlo analysis. Our empirical findings confirm that the Lucas critique is relevant for the shift in U.S. monetary policy behavior in the early 1980s.
It is difficult to underestimate the importance of Lucas (1976) in the development of modern macroeconomic thought. The introduction of rational expectations in macroeconomics in the middle of the 1970s represented an intellectual revolution for the profession and a serious challenge for large-scale, backward-looking econometric models that were used for policy analysis. Lucas argued that changes in policy have an immediate effect on agents' decision rules since they are inherently forward-looking and adapt to the effects of the new policy regime. An important corollary of this argument is that any policy evaluation based on backward-looking macroeconomic models is misleading whenever such policy shifts occur.
Empirical studies of the validity of the Lucas critique (e.g. Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003, Rudebusch, 2005) suggest that it is unimportant in practice. Tests for parameter stability in backward-looking specifications or reduced forms of macroeconomic relationships typically fail to reject the null of structural stability in the presence of well-documented policy shifts.
This evidence would support the conclusion that policy changes are, in the terminology of Leeper and Zha (2003) , 'modest' enough not to alter the behavior of private agents in a manner that is detectable by the econometrician. A further implication is that backwardlooking monetary models of the type advocated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , which perform well empirically, are safe to use in policy experiments.
We argue in this paper that the failure of these studies to detect Lucas-critique effects rests on the use of parameter stability tests such as the Chow break-point test and the superexogeneity test. These tests implicitly assume equality of the variances of the reducedform innovations across sub-samples. It is, however, well known, at least since Toyoda (1974) , that even moderate heteroskedasticity has a considerable impact on the significance levels of the null of parameter stability, which leads to an incorrect acceptance of parameter invariance. Moreover, and similar to Lindé (2001) , we also find evidence of a small-sample bias which tends to hide the instability of backward-looking specifications.
At the heart of Lucas' critique lies an emphasis on the use of fully-specified, optimisationbased dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for policy analysis. We follow this approach and work within the confines of a structural New Keynesian model that has been widely used for monetary policy analysis. We treat this model as our DGP from which we generate simulated time series for a Monte Carlo analysis. This allows us to control the environment in which the policy change occurs. Otherwise, it might be difficult to distinguish between actual policy shifts and changes in the economy's driving processes.
Our main experiment is to model the monetary policy change in the U.S. that occurred at the turn of the 1980s. We follow Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) in assuming that policy during the 1970s responded only weakly to inflation, whereas with the start of Volcker's tenure policy became much more aggressively anti-inflationary. In the context of our model, this implies that in the first sub-sample the rational expectations (RE) equilibrium was indeterminate, and determinate later on. On the basis of the approach developed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) to describe indeterminate equilibria, we show, first, that a policy shift of the magnitude observed in the Federal Reserve's monetary policy rule is capable of reproducing the historical decline in the volatility of real activity, inflation, and the interest rate. Furthermore, we demonstrate that such a decline invalidates the assumption of constant reduced-form innovation variances in a widely used backwardlooking model of aggregate supply and aggregate demand estimated over the sub-samples associated with the regime shift.
Monte Carlo simulations show that the instability of the error variances severely affects the power of the Chow test and the superexogeneity test to the effect that it prevents the rejection of the incorrect null hypothesis of parameter stability. When the heteroskedasticity in the estimated backward-looking specifications is accounted for, we find robust evidence in favor of the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique. An application to U.S. data reveals that controlling for the decline in the variance of the estimated error terms matters also in practice. We show that this overturns the results from parameter stability tests which are based on the (incorrect) assumption of equal error variance between sub-samples. Hence, we conclude that the Lucas critique is alive and well.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the effect of equilibrium inde-terminacy on the stability of reduced-form models. The message of the paper is, however, not predicated on policy changes that induce switches between determinacy and indeterminacy, but this assumption helps to sharpen our argument. We also report results from simulations that preserve a specific regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses analytical results in the context of simple examples on how policy changes in structural models affect their reduced-form representations and how this relates to the debate about the empirical validity of the Lucas critique. Section 3 introduces the structural model that we use as DGP for the Monte Carlo study. This section also shows that the policy-induced shift from indeterminacy to determinacy is capable of explaining the U.S. Great Moderation. Section 4 describes the simulation strategy for testing the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique. In section 5, we report the Monte Carlo evidence on the structural stability of a backward-looking model of aggregate supply and demand, and provide a sensitivity analysis for variations in the values of some parameters of the structural model. The sixth section contains empirical results obtained on actual U.S. data, while the last section concludes.
Rational Expectations Equilibria and the Lucas Critique
We assume throughout our paper that the data are generated by a DSGE model. Analyzing the effects of parameter changes thus requires an understanding of the reduced-form properties of structural linear rational expectations models. In this sense, our paper is similar to Lindé (2001) and Rudebusch (2005) . However, we go further than the earlier literature in analyzing the effects of a policy break that changes the equilibrium properties of the economy, specifically, a change from indeterminacy to determinacy. In this section, we therefore give a brief overview on indeterminacy in linear rational expectations models.
Determinate and Indeterminate Equilibria
Consider the simple expectational difference equation:
where a is a parameter, ε t is a white noise process with mean zero and variance σ 2 , and E t is the rational expectations operator conditional on information at time t. It is well known that the type of solution depends on the value of the parameter a. If |a| < 1 there is a unique ('determinate') solution which is simply:
On the other hand, if |a| > 1, there are multiple solutions and the rational expectations equilibrium is indeterminate.
In order to derive the entire set of solutions we follow the approach developed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) . For this purpose it is often convenient to rewrite the model by introducing endogenous forecast errors η t = x t − E t−1 x t . Define ξ t = E t x t+1 so that equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Under indeterminacy this is a stable difference equation which imposes no further restrictions on the evolution of the endogenous forecast error η t . 1 Hence, any covariance-stationary stochastic process for η t is a solution for this linear rational expectations model. The forecast error can then be expressed as a linear combination of the model's fundamental disturbances and extraneous sources of uncertainty, typically labeled 'sunspots'. The coefficients on the shocks in this decomposition generally depend on parameters of the model and on parameters that index a specific sunspot equilibrium. To wit, the forecast error can be written as:
where the sunspot ζ t is a martingale-difference sequence, and m is an unrestricted parameter. 2 Substituting this into Eq. (2) yields the full solution under indeterminacy:
The evolution of x t now depends on an additional (structural) parameter m which indexes specific rational expectations equilibria.
Indeterminacy affects the behavior of the model in three main ways. First, indeterminate solutions exhibit a much richer lag structure and more persistence than the corresponding determinate solution. This feature has been exploited by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) in distinguishing between the two types of rational expectations equilibria in U.S.
data. In the simple example, this is strikingly evident: under determinacy the solution for
x t is white noise, while under indeterminacy the solution is described by an ARMA (1, 1) process. Specifically, the (composite) error term exhibits both serial correlation and a different variance when compared to the determinate solution. Second, under indeterminacy 1 In the case of determinacy, the restriction imposed is that ξ t = 0, ∀ t, which implies η t = ε t . 2 There is a technical subtlety in that ζ t is actually, in the terminology of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) , a reduced-form sunspot shock, with ζ t = m ζ ζ * t . Furthermore, in less simple models, there would be additional restrictions on the coefficients which depend on other structural parameters.
sunspot shocks can affect equilibrium dynamics. Other things being equal, data generated by sunspot equilibria are inherently more volatile than their determinate counterparts. The third implication, especially emphasized by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) , is that indeterminacy affects the response of the model to fundamental shocks, whereas the response to sunspot shocks is uniquely determined. In the example, innovations to ε t could either increase or decrease x t depending on the sign of m.
Indeterminacy and the Lucas Critique
We now try to provide some insight into the analytics of the Lucas critique by means of a simple example. We consider the following two-equation model which describes the evolution of an economic variable x t and a policy variable y t :
ε 1t , ε 2t are white noise processes with variances σ 2 1 , σ 2 2 , respectively. a, b are structural parameters, and c is a policy parameter. We assume for simplicity that all parameters are positive. Eq. (4) is a feedback rule of the type often used in monetary policy models.
The model has a unique rational expectations equilibrium if 0 < c < 1−a b , the solution of which is:
As in the simple example above, both variables are white noise processes. If c > 1−a b the solution is indeterminate. The laws of motion for the two variables are as follows:
Again, the change in the stochastic properties of the variables, when moving across the parameter space, is quite evident. If (3) - (4) is the DGP, then the reduced-form equations above are the representations upon which tests for the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique would have to be based.
The type of experiment we are interested in is an exogenous, unanticipated change in the policy parameter c. We can distinguish four different scenarios: a shift from determinacy to indeterminacy, from indeterminacy to determinacy, and changes that preserve previously determinate and indeterminate equilibria. If the break in c is such that the solution stays determinate, the behavior of x t is unaffected while the variance of y t changes. However, an econometrician could not distinguish between a change in σ 2 2 and the policy coefficient by observing y t . A change in the variance of ε 1t , on the other hand, could be deduced from observations on both variables.
The more interesting case is a change in policy behavior that moves c across the boundary 1−a b that separates the determinacy from the indeterminacy region. Suppose the economy is initially in an indeterminate equilibrium associated with a policy parameter c 0 . An unexpected (and believed to be permanent) policy shift to c 1 < 1−a b < c 0 moves the economy to a determinate equilibrium. This implies a dramatic change in the nature of the stochastic processes for x t and y t , as they switch from persistence to white noise. Specifically, both their variance and the degree of auto-correlation decline. Furthermore, sunspot shocks, and the extra volatility associated with them, no longer affect the dynamics. It is this type of scenario we have in mind in our empirical analysis. The standard example is the change in monetary policy that occurred during Paul Volcker's tenure at the Board of Governors.
Naturally, similar reasoning applies to the opposite case when a policy change moves the economy from a determinate to an indeterminate equilibrium.
Yet, even if equilibrium properties are unaffected by shifts in policy, the properties of the reduced-form model are not. Crucially, the variance of the error term in a regression of the endogenous variables on their first lag would (i) change with the shift in policy, and (ii) be correlated with the regressor. The latter issue is, of course, well known, and methods to deal with this, such as IV-estimation, are now widely used. 3 The former is not as well appreciated, however. Consequently, the main thrust of our paper is directed at this form of heteroskedasticity, which reduces the power of parameter stability tests based on reduced-form regressions. 4 
The Structural Model
In this section, we lay out a small-scale sticky-price monetary model which will serve as DGP for the Monte Carlo experiments. After describing the calibration, we use the structural model to assess the extent to which the 'good policy' and the 'good luck' explanations of the U.S. Great Moderation are capable of replicating the facts.
Specification
Our simulation analysis is based on a log-linearized, microfounded New-Keynesian sticky price model of the business cycle of the kind popularized by Clarida et al. (1999) , King (2000) and Woodford (2003) among others. The model consists of three aggregate relationships which describe the dynamic behavior of output y t , inflation π t , and the nominal interest rate R t :
All variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state.
Eq. (5) is a log-linearized IS-curve derived from a household's intertemporal optimization problem in which consumption and nominal bond holdings are the control variables.
Since there is no physical capital in this economy, consumption is proportional to total resources up to an exogenous process g t . The latter is typically interpreted as a government spending shock or a shock to preferences. 5 The parameter τ > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The Phillips-curve relationship (6) describes inflation dynamics as a function of output.
It captures the staggered feature of an economy with Calvo-type price setting in which firms adjust their optimal price with a constant probability in any period, independently of the time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price setting creates an incentive to adjust prices by more the higher expected future inflation is. The contemporaneous rate of inflation is thus related to the difference between output and the stochastic marginal cost of production z t via the parameter κ > 0, which can be interpreted as the inverse of the sacrifice ratio. 0 < β < 1 is the agents' discount factor.
The policy rule (7) characterizes the behavior of the monetary authorities according to which the central bank adjusts the policy variable in response to current inflation and the output gap (y t − z t ). ψ π , ψ y ≥ 0 are the policy coefficients. These adjustments are implemented smoothly, with 0 < ρ R < 1 capturing the degree of interest rate inertia. The random variable ε R,t stands for the monetary policy shock, which can be interpreted either as unexpected deviations from the policy rule or as a policy implementation error. We assume it to be a white noise process with mean zero and variance σ 2 ε . The model description is completed by specifying the stochastic properties of the exogenous shocks g t and z t . We assume they are first-order autoregressive processes with lag-coefficients 0 ≤ ρ g , ρ z < 1. Their innovations are assumed to be i.i.d. with variances σ 2 g and σ 2 z , respectively. The equation system (5) - (7), together with the two processes for the exogenous shocks, describes a linear rational expectations model that can be solved using the methods described in Sims (2002) . We solve the model for both determinacy and indeterminacy. In the latter case, we follow the approach developed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). The interest rate response to inflation over the indeterminacy sample does not guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium because ψ π = 0.4 violates the Taylor principle. 6 On the other hand, the parameter constellation associated with Period II guarantees a determinate equilibrium. As detailed above, the solution of the model under indeterminacy is affected along various dimensions. Most importantly, equilibrium dynamics can be driven by sunspot fluctuations. Secondly, the transmission of fundamental shocks can be altered relative to the unique rational expectations solution. Having set the variance of sunspot disturbances to zero, we will thus focus on the transmission mechanism effect.
Calibration

Replicating the Stylized Facts
Before evaluating the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique, we assess the extent to which the magnitude of historical policy shifts can account for the decline in volatility and persistence of inflation, output, and the interest rate observed in U.S. data at the beginning There is, however, a simmering debate whether this was due to good luck (a decline in the volatility of exogenous shocks) or good policy (a shift to a more stabilizing policy regime). Empirical evidence by Stock and Watson (2002) and Kim et al. (2004) shows that a sizeable part of such decline was driven by a reduction in the volatility of the reduced-form innovations of estimated backward-looking specifications for inflation and output. This has been invariably interpreted as prima facie evidence in favor of good luck. 7 We thus ask the question whether the good luck and good policy scenarios are capable of explaining this decline in volatilities in the context of our model. We present results for two sets of model calibrations. In the first experiment, we change the policy parameters such that the equilibrium switches from indeterminacy to determinacy. Differences in the dynamics are therefore driven only by a shift in the monetary policy rule, as all non-policy parameters of the model are kept fixed across regimes. In the second calibration, we simulate a decline in the variance of the structural shocks such as to match the magnitude of the decline in the volatility of inflation and output observed in the data. All other parameters are fixed in the second simulation. In particular, the Taylor principle applies and the equilibrium is therefore always determinate.
Simulation results for the good policy hypothesis are reported in Table 2 In line with the evidence in Cogley and Sargent (2005) , the most dramatic change occurs for inflation whose inertia drops by 58%. The impact on the interest rate is considerably smaller. This can be explained by the higher smoothing parameter under determinacy which outweighs the impact of the 'extra' persistence induced by monetary policy under indeterminacy. 8 We contrast this with the statistics obtained under the good luck hypothesis, reported in Table 3 We also want to emphasize that the Lucas critique is economically relevant in our setting.
Two metrics that are typically considered for this assessment are the sum of the autoregressive coefficients of inflation and the value of a loss function that weighs the unconditional variances of inflation and output. The results of Table 2 indicate that the critique is, indeed, economically important in that both the persistence of inflation and the sum of the unconditional variances of inflation and output decline drastically in the move to a more anti-inflationary policy.
Overall, we find that both explanations are capable of explaining the Great Moderation.
However, only the good policy hypothesis successfully reproduces the decline in inflation persistence. A shift from passive to active monetary policy can account on its own for the sharp decline in the volatility and persistence of inflation and output observed in the early 1980s. Furthermore, the decline in the volatility of the series is likely to contaminate the properties of the error terms in estimated reduced-form models. As many widely used break point tests like the Chow test are based on the assumption of constancy of the innovations variance, we show below that the neglected heteroskedasticity leads to incorrect inference on the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique.
Testing for the Lucas Critique
This section presents a simple algorithm to investigate the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique. To focus on the importance of a change in monetary policy, we simulate a shift in the coefficients of the policy rule while keeping the parameters describing the structure of the economy fixed across simulations. For each simulation, we obtain two sets of artificial data. The first set is generated from an indeterminate equilibrium and is associated with the pre-1979 estimates of the policy rule typically found in the literature. The second sample is generated under the assumption of determinacy and it corresponds to the post-1979 description of policy behavior. Any difference in the estimates on the two sets of artificial data is thus only attributable to changes in policy. As the Lucas critique is about (in)stability of reduced-form parameters, we specify a backward-looking representation of the economy and then assess the impact of a policy shift on the reduced-form representation.
A Backward-Looking Model
The backward-looking model of aggregate supply and demand is a quarterly version of the specification in Svensson (1997) , which has been used by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2005) among many others:
Inflation depends on its own past values within a year and on the lagged value of real activity. Aggregate demand is characterized by an autoregressive structure with four lags augmented by the lagged value of the real interest rate. The model is closed with a standard
Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing:
The model (8)- (10) is estimated on simulated data under the assumption that the DGP is the structural model (5)-(7).
We want to emphasize that we do not restrict the backward-looking model to the reduced-form representation of the DSGE model. In particular, the backward-looking specification is allowed, but not required, to have a richer lag structure relative to the DSGE model. In other words, we let the data choose what lags of the dependent variables have explanatory power. Our reasoning is twofold. First, earlier contributions have used very similar backward-looking specifications and we wish to contrast our results with those of the previous literature. Second, and more importantly, we have shown in Section 2 that equilibrium indeterminacy is an additional source of serial correlation in the error terms. 9 Augmenting the backward-looking specification with additional lags of the dependent variable is a simple way to make the residuals white noise and therefore control for serial correlation.
Simulation Strategy
To assess the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique, we design a Monte Carlo experiment in which we postulate a break of the magnitude of the historical shift in the Federal Reserve's policy rule. All other parameters of the structural model are kept fixed across policy regimes, and we are thus isolating any Lucas-critique effects.
The procedure in the simulations is as follows:
1. Solve the structural model under both indeterminacy and determinacy, and generate two samples of 82 and 61 observations 10 for output, inflation and the interest rate. 11 2. For each artificial sample, estimate the backward-looking equations for output, inflation, and the interest rate.
3. Perform tests for error variance constancy and parameter stability of the backwardlooking equations across the two periods; compute the relevant statistics and probability values.
4. Repeat steps 1. to 3. 20, 000 times; for each sub-period select the median values of the statistics of interest. 9 We are grateful to Adrian Pagan for raising our awareness of this issue. 10 The number of observations has been chosen to match the quarterly data points which are typically used in sub-sample analyses of US data (see Schorfheide, 2004, and Clarida et al., 2000) . The first period ranges from 1960:1 to 1979:2 while the second corresponds to 1982:4 to 1997:4. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced to provide us with a stochastic vector of initial conditions, which are then discarded. 11 The solution of the model under indeterminacy is computed using the continuity assumption in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . Similar results, not reported but available upon request, are obtained by imposing that the structural shocks are orthogonal to the sunspot shocks. If the probability of rejecting parameter stability in Steps 1 -4 computed under the assumption of a policy break is higher than the probability in Step 5 based on the assumption of no change in the policy parameters, then the Lucas critique is judged empirically relevant.
Results on Simulated Data
This section presents the results of the Monte Carlo analysis. We present the relevant statistics of the test for equal innovation variances and parameter stability together with some robustness checks. Table 4 reports residual standard deviations from the estimated model (8) - (10) variances between sample regimes and are therefore subject to our criticism. Toyoda (1974) has demonstrated that the size and power of the Chow test can be considerably affected by neglecting differences in reduced-form error variances. The problem is most serious when samples of similar size are used. When overall sample size is small even moderate degrees of heteroskedasticity reduce the power of the test significantly. Both scenarios apply to the historical episode of the monetary policy shift in the U.S. Perhaps not surprisingly, the conclusions drawn in the literature almost always go against the statistical importance of Lucas' critique. 13 We consequently ask the question whether the failure to detect any effects is due to a lack of power of these tests.
Testing for Equal Innovation Variances
Parameter Stability Tests
To quantify the importance of heteroskedasticity for the results of conventional parameter stability tests, we follow the literature and use the Chow and superexogeneity tests on the two simulated samples. The superexogeneity test measures the probability of rejecting the null of parameter stability in the output and inflation equations conditional on having rejected the null hypothesis of parameter stability in the interest rate equation. 14 We present results for three versions of the parameter stability and superexogeneity tests. The first version is based on the OLS residual sum of squares, RSS, of (8) and (9), and therefore implicitly (and incorrectly) assumes homoskedasticity. A prominent example of this class of tests is the Chow statistics used by Lindé (2001) and Rudebusch (2005) :
where m is the number of restrictions in an equation of k parameters and i = 1, 2 indexes the sub-samples.
The second and third versions of the tests, in contrast, account for possible heteroskedasticity across sub-samples. In particular, we use a GLS version based on a two-step procedure.
In the first step, Eqs. (8) and (9) are estimated by OLS over the two sub-samples. In the second step, the variables are normalized by the square root of the estimated innovation variance-covariance matrix. Statistics of interest are then computed using the residuals of the OLS estimates of (8) and (9) whereby the original variables are replaced with the transformed variables.
The third version is based on the difference of the parameter estimates,θ i . The test statistic is:
13 An exception is Lindé (2001) who argues in favor of its empirical relevance on the basis of an empirical money demand equation, showing that the superexogeneity tests suffers from a serious small-sample problem.
14 See Favero and Hendry (1992) for the strategy behind this test.
whereV i is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameters corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms. Following Newey and West (1987),
we set the truncation lag in the autocorrelation function of the residuals, q i , to f loor(4 * (T i /100)ˆ(2/9)), which corresponds to 3 in our sub-samples. 15 Parameter stability tests based on the RSS such as (11) and on the Wald form such as (12) give the same algebraic results only in one special case: when the restrictions on the parameters are linear and the error covariance matrix is homoskedastic (see Hamilton, 1994 , Ch. 8, and Hansen, 2001 ). The Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, in fact, has no influence on the RSS, implying that only an expression such as (12) is suited for dealing with heteroskedasticity. Table 5 reports the results of the three versions of the parameter stability and superexogeneity tests of 5% empirical size. The size-corrected power of the respective tests, i.e., the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false, is computed using the empirical 5% significance level and the simulation strategy described in Section 4.2. According to the standard Chow test (labeled 'OLS-based') there is little evidence of parameter instability in the output and inflation equations indicated by probabilities that are never larger than 0.10. Yet, the Chow test is capable of detecting instability in the interest rate equation.
The power of the test to detect parameter instability increases noticeably for our second and third versions which take the instability of the reduced-form innovations variance into account. When a GLS-based correction is used, the probability of (correctly) rejecting the null hypothesis increases by a factor of five for both the output and the inflation equations.
While the power of the test for the inflation specification is good, it is still less than satisfactory in the case of output. This need not be surprising per se for two reasons. First, there may still be a small-sample issue. We investigate this possibility further below. Second, it may very well be the case that the effect of the policy parameter change on the behavior of the output specification is statistically small. In other words, the policy intervention might The simulation evidence on the performance of the superexogeneity tests corroborates the notion of a bias induced by neglecting heteroskedasticity. Incidentally, the probabilities of rejecting the null of superexogeneity reported in Panel B of Table 5 are virtually identical.
We conclude that the test for parameter stability using either a GLS-based or a Newey-West correction for the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation always have higher power than the tests based on OLS.
Sensitivity Analysis
We assess the robustness of our assessment along three dimensions. We first modify our baseline calibration with respect to a few key parameters, while maintaining the regime shift from indeterminacy to determinacy. Secondly, we keep the baseline specification for the structural parameters, but simulate a policy shift between determinate regimes. Finally, we address the small-sample problems emphasized by Lindé (2001) .
The results for variations of our baseline calibration are reported in Table 6 . We consider three cases. The simulation using a smaller Phillips-curve slope coefficient κ = 0. shift from indeterminacy to determinacy reduces both persistence and volatility of the endogenous variables. Policy shifts that maintain a determinate equilibrium, on the other hand, have a less dramatic effect on the reduced-form error variance. 16 Our experiment is to change the inflation coefficient from 1.5 to 2.5. The other structural and policy parameters are as in Table 1 . Two observations emerge: first, the policy shift within the determinacy region is less successful in replicating the stylized facts, in particular the decline in output volatility and persistence. While obviously far from conclusive, we regard this as a simple plausibility check on the driving forces behind the Great Moderation. Secondly, tests for error variance constancy, reported in Table 8 , show that the null of homoskedasticity is not rejected at typical confidence levels with the exception of inflation. Differences between variances are in any case noticeably smaller than in the baseline case. Not surprisingly, this affects the improvement in power of the heteroskedasticity-adjusted test statistics in Table   9 . The size-adjusted probabilities of rejecting parameter stability and superexogeneity are now more similar.
Small-sample problems as documented by Lindé (2001) in the case of the superexogeneity test are also a possible explanation. We return to our baseline calibration and simulate a shift from indeterminacy to determinacy, but this time impose a sub-sample size of 150
observations, twice as many as in the baseline case. The results can be found in Table 10 .
Small-sample problems are clearly present for all three versions of the test for parameter stability. Interestingly, a doubling of sample size has little effect on the probabilities of rejecting the null hypothesis for the output equation, while the power of heteroskedasticityadjusted statistics improves by more than that of the simple OLS-based statistics. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the superexogeneity test. While the focus of the paper is on the policy shift associated with the beginning of Volcker's tenure, we cannot exclude, in principle, that the backward-looking model (8)- (10) is in fact characterized by multiple structural breaks. To investigate this possibility, we use the tests for (pure) multiple changes at unknown dates proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) .
Following the practical recommendations in Bai and Perron (2003), we set the number of maximum structural breaks, M , to 4, and consider a trimming ε of 0.15. In analogy with 17 Andrews and Fair (1988) show that under the null hypothesis of parameter stability,θ 1 =θ 2 , the Wald statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ 2 random variable with k degrees of freedom.
the testing procedure on simulated data, different variances of the residuals are allowed across segments. P-values are based on 10, 000 bootstrap repetitions obtained under the null of parameter stability. The significance level is 5%.
The first two columns of Table ( 11) report the UDmax and WDmax double maximum statistics for a test of no structural break against the alternative of an unknown number of breaks given the upper bound M . According to both statistics, there is at least one structural change in all three equations. To determine the number of breaks we then examine the Sup-F( + 1| ) statistics for testing the null of break(s) against the alternative that an additional break exists. The third column of Table ( 11) shows that the hypothesis that only one change occurred is never rejected against the alternative of at least two changes.
The estimates of the break date obtained by minimizing the sum of the RSS over the sub-samples are 1983:2 for output, 1981:2 for inflation and 1980:3 for the policy rule.
Conclusions
We present two main arguments in this paper. First, we emphasize that within the framework of structural DSGE models, a change in policy parameters affects the stability of both reduced-form coefficients and reduced-form error variances. We show that tests for parameter instability based on the assumption of homoskedasticity have low power. We consequently argue that this is behind the tendency in the literature to reject the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique. We suggest adjustments for heteroskedasticity in commonly used parameter stability tests, and show by means of a Monte Carlo analysis that the power of these tests is improved and Lucas critique effects are detected in simulated data.
As an empirical example we test for the presence of Lucas critique effects on reducedform specifications of output and inflation using post-war U.S. data. We do, indeed, find evidence of a break in the behavior of the Federal Reserve in 1980, and of parameter instability across the sub-samples using our heteroskedasticity-adjusted test statistic. We believe this is a new finding in the literature. Obviously, our results are model-dependent, and further investigation in a richer framework is certainly warranted.
We want to conclude on a somewhat critical note. Given a fully-specified, structural DSGE model as a DGP, the question arises why researchers should bother at all with reduced-form specifications that are subject to the Lucas critique. One answer is certainly ease of implementation. Furthermore, very little is known about structural break tests within the context of estimated DSGE-models. 18 However, a deeper issue is whether DSGE- 18 A notable exception is Ireland (2001) . Initial steps in this direction have also been made by Canova models that are used for policy analysis are not themselves subject to the Lucas critique.
Implicitly, Lucas' argument rests on the notion that the information set of economic agents
and their decision problems were not fully specified in traditional macroeconometric models.
Yet, with the use of ad hoc monetary policy rules that very issue surely comes up in DSGE models that do not include optimizing policy-makers. 
